Section 1The ridership reality

Nationally, about 3 percent of commuters travel to work by public transit, according to the Census Bureau's American Community Survey. Years after the pandemic, transit ridership nationwide still has not recovered to 2019 levels, even as agency budgets have grown. The trend lines and the funding lines point in opposite directions.

Every transportation dollar spent is a dollar not spent elsewhere. When a mode serving a small minority of trips claims a large share of capital and operating budgets, the burden of proof belongs on the spending — not on the taxpayers questioning it.

~3% Share of American commuters who travel to work by public transit. U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey

Section 2The fare gap nobody talks about

Before the pandemic, fares covered roughly a third of U.S. transit operating costs on average, per the National Transit Database. Since then, that share has fallen dramatically — meaning taxpayers, most of whom rarely ride, now cover the overwhelming majority of every trip's cost.

Montgomery County went further: Ride On buses became fare-free in 2025. Whatever the policy's merits, the accounting is unambiguous — farebox recovery is now zero, and every single ride is fully taxpayer-funded. That makes one demand non-negotiable: publish the per-rider subsidy, route by route, so residents can see what they are buying.

Section 3The capital-project problem: the Purple Line

Montgomery County hosts one of the nation's clearest cautionary tales. The Purple Line light rail was sold as an innovative public-private partnership. Its cost has since climbed past $9 billion — billions above the original agreement — while the opening date slipped roughly five years. Cost growth on that scale would end a highway project's career; for transit megaprojects it is routinely absorbed and rebudgeted.

One standard for every mode

We hold road projects to a benefit-cost test with published before-and-after data. Transit projects deserve exactly the same discipline: realistic ridership forecasts, hard budget accountability, and consequences when projections fail.

Section 4Dedicated bus lanes: prove the demand

The Flash bus rapid transit line has operated on US 29 since 2020, using a mix of dedicated and shared lanes. Where a bus lane is proposed, the question is straightforward: does the bus lane move more people through the corridor than the general-purpose lane it replaces?

That is an empirical question with a knowable answer. A dedicated lane serving frequent, full buses can pass the test. A dedicated lane reserved for an occasional, lightly loaded bus — while thousands of vehicles compress into the remaining lanes — cannot. The data should decide, and the data should be public.

  • Publish throughput: people moved per lane per hour, bus lane versus general lane, measured — not modeled after the fact.
  • Publish loads: average passengers per bus by route and time of day.
  • Sunset reviews: every dedicated lane re-justified on published data every few years, or returned to general traffic.

Section 5The standard we propose

  1. Report per-rider subsidy for every route, every year, in plain language.
  2. Fund performance: direct service dollars toward routes and corridors with demonstrated, sustained demand.
  3. Cap megaproject risk: independent cost review before approval and binding accountability when budgets are blown.
  4. Justify every dedicated lane with measured person-throughput, with automatic sunset review.
  5. Right-size the system: redeploy or retire chronically underused service instead of subsidizing it indefinitely.